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In this paper, I investigate how the notion of epistemic injustice relates to two distinct, 
though not incompatible, models of the phenomenon of silencing: epistemic and linguistic. I 
argue that a linguistic model of silencing can be used to elucidate the nature of hermeneutical 
injustice—a type of epistemic injustice identified by Miranda Fricker. I put forth my own 
reformulation of the linguistic model of silencing as locutionary (as opposed to illocutionary) 
disablement, when it occurs in cases of hermeneutical injustice, and I argue that this 
reformulation can respond to the criticism that Fricker’s construal of hermeneutical injustice falls 
prey to charges of epistemic hegemony. I conclude by suggesting that this form of silencing, 
which has its origins in a history of political domination and dehumanization, is connected to a 
third, distinctive form of epistemic injustice (beyond testimonial and hermeneutical injustice), 
which concerns the unfair distribution of the burdens of communication between members of 
differently situated social groups. 
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Introduction 
 
Rachel Jeantel, a young black woman, served as a key prosecution witness in the 2013 
trial of George Zimmerman for the murder of Trayvon Martin. A friend of Martin, Jeantel was 
on the phone with Martin when the altercation with Zimmerman began, so her testimony was to 
be especially illuminating in providing evidence of how the events unfolded. However, once she 
took the stand, communicative dysfunction ensued; and in the media and larger public 
conversation, Jeantel was attacked and ridiculed for her supposedly “incomprehensible” 
testimony. But as some linguists, such as John Rickford (2014) and John McWhorter (2013), 
point out, Jeantel was, in fact, speaking a perfectly comprehensible dialect of English, African 
American Vernacular English (AAVE, or Ebonics), and the ridicule leveled against Jeantel was 
undeniably racist and sexist in nature. As Brittney Cooper (2013) explains: 
The unique quality of her black vernacular speaking style became hypervisible 
against the backdrop of powerful white men fluently deploying corporate, proper 
English in ways that she could not do.  The way they spoke to her was designed 
not only to discredit her, but to condescend to and humiliate her. 
 
Because of these racist and sexist judgments regarding Jeantel’s speech and demeanor, her 
attempt to share important knowledge via her testimony was seriously and wrongly impeded; as 
such, she seems to have suffered from what Miranda Fricker (2007) would call an epistemic 
injustice. 
In this paper, I investigate how this notion of epistemic injustice relates to two distinct, 
though not incompatible, models of the phenomenon of silencing: epistemic and linguistic. 
While Fricker follows an epistemic model of silencing and locates it within the context of the 
first type of epistemic injustice that she describes—testimonial injustice—I argue that a linguistic 
model of silencing can be used to elucidate the nature of the second type of epistemic injustice—
hermeneutical injustice. I begin in section 1 by providing an overview of both the epistemic and 
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linguistic models of silencing. Then, in section 2, I argue that a reformulation of the linguistic 
model of silencing as locutionary (as opposed to illocutionary) disablement can help respond to 
the criticism that Fricker’s construal of hermeneutical injustice falls prey to charges of epistemic 
hegemony, and I put forth my own reformulation of silencing as locutionary disablement (three 
types, corresponding to Austin’s three distinctions among locutionary acts) as it occurs in cases 
of hermeneutical injustice. Lastly, in section 3, I suggest that this form of silencing is connected 
to a third, distinctive form of epistemic injustice (beyond testimonial and hermeneutical 
injustice), which concerns the unfair distribution of the burdens of communication between 
members of differently situated social groups. I call this third type of epistemic injustice the 
epistemic injustice of interpretive burden. I claim that this injustice arises due to a particular 
history of political domination—that of White supremacy, as articulated by Charles Mills in The 
Racial Contract—and the deliberate dehumanization and devaluation of marginalized groups and 
their linguistic practices, and willful epistemic ignorance on the part of the dominant group.  
Because of the structural nature of this sort of oppression I explain how it can occur even 
in circumstances in which theorizers and activists are attempting to ameliorate the former two 
types of epistemic injustice. The epistemic injustice of interpretive burden is particularly 
prevalent in the case of White-dominated feminist theory. When their voices are not outright 
silenced in this domain, women of color are often expected to take on the responsibility of 
bridging the interpretive gap—due to either language barriers or divergent life experiences (or 
both)—between their White interlocutors and themselves. This particular form of epistemic 
injustice must also be addressed and resolved, if those who claim to be committed to dismantling 
historically unjust power structures wish to succeed in their social justice-oriented efforts. 
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1. Testimonial Injustice and Two Models of Silencing 
1.1 Overview of Testimonial Injustice 
In Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007), Miranda Fricker offers 
an account of two types of injustice that are distinctly epistemic in nature: testimonial injustice 
and hermeneutical injustice. These injustices are epistemic because they harm an individual in 
her capacity as a knower. But they are also inextricably linked to ethical injustices arising from 
systematic imbalances in social and political power. Fricker argues that because these epistemic 
injustices arise from such imbalances in social and political power, in order to confront and 
ultimately mitigate the effects of such injustices, we must consider the socially and politically 
situated contexts in which they occur. 
As noted above, the first of these two types of epistemic injustice is testimonial injustice. 
Fricker argues that testimonial injustice is perpetrated by a hearer against a speaker, when the 
hearer’s credibility judgment of the speaker is diminished due to prejudicial stereotypes 
associated with the speaker’s social type. This is both a distinctly epistemic injustice—in that it 
harms the speaker in her capacity as a knower—and an ethical injustice—in that the prejudicial 
stereotypes upon which the diminished credibility judgment is formed are the result of an 
imbalance of social power. When a speaker’s credibility is diminished, this leads to a demotion 
in the speaker’s epistemic status from “informant to source of information, from subject to 
object” (Fricker 2007:133). Drawing on Edward Craig’s State of Nature story (1990), Fricker 
explains that one’s status as an informant, as opposed to a mere source of information, is 
significant in that distinguishing among good and bad informants is essential to our epistemic 
practices and to our very concept of knowledge. When a speaker is perceived as not credible as 
an informant, she is excluded from participating in the exchange and production of knowledge 
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that occurs amongst “the community of informants” (2007:130). Her testimony might be taken as 
evidence of some kind, but it is the sort of evidence that might equally have been given by an 
object—for instance, a thermometer might be a source of information regarding the temperature, 
but because it is an object, it is a mere source of information rather than an informant. When a 
speaker’s testimony is taken as evidence in this way (that is, as coming from a mere source of 
information), she is epistemically objectified. 
Thus Fricker identifies the intrinsic harm of testimonial injustice in the epistemic 
objectification of the speaker. When a speaker is objectified in this way, her words no longer 
count as testimony coming from a knower; instead, she is treated as a mere source of 
information. However, it is important to note that objectification per se is not necessarily 
harmful—it constitutes an epistemic harm only when the reason for objectifying a speaker stems 
from prejudicial stereotypes about the speaker’s social types.1 Such stereotypes arise in the 
context of systematic ethical injustice, and therefore, their deployment in judging a speaker’s 
epistemic status is also unjust.  
1.2 Sexual Objectification and the Epistemic Model of Silencing 
Fricker describes the link between the harm of epistemic objectification and the harm of 
sexual objectification, writing:  
[O]ur main interest in the connection between sexual and epistemic objectification 
lies not in the general idea that they might be causally related via a common 
prejudice, but more specifically in the possibility that a climate of sexual 
objectification might give rise to cases of testimonial injustice so extreme that the 
epistemic injustice crosses over into a fundamental communicative dysfunction. 
(2007:139) 
 
                                                 
1 A case in which epistemic objectification would not constitute a harm: a tired and hungry young child is acting out 
and yells at his mother, “I hate you, Mommy!” His mother knows he acts this way when he is tired and hungry, so 
she does not treat his words as conveying his true meaning as a knowing agent; she treats him instead as a source of 
information—that information being, “My child is tired and hungry.” 
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This “fundamental communicative dysfunction” leads to a phenomenon known as silencing. 
Silencing occurs when a speaker’s credibility is diminished so severely—prior to even offering 
any piece of testimony—that when she does speak, “her utterance simply fails to register with 
[the hearer’s] testimonial sensibility” (2007:140). That is, the hearer does not recognize the 
speaker as even being able to offer any sort of testimony—the speaker is totally objectified in 
these cases.  
Fricker notes another account of silencing, offered by Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby, 
who frame this phenomenon in the context of philosophy of language (particularly the speech act 
theory of J.L. Austin), rather than epistemology. Specifically, Langton and Hornsby focus on the 
importance of the communicative relationship between speaker and hearer, which is in some way 
undermined when silencing occurs. Curiously, however, Fricker quickly seems to reject their 
linguistic model of silencing in favor of the epistemic model because, as she claims, “[the 
epistemic model] requires less erosion of women’s human status before the silencing effect kicks 
in” (2007:142). I find Fricker’s dismissal of the linguistic model curious because, 1) like José 
Medina (2012), I do not immediately see how the two models are inherently incompatible with 
one another, and more importantly, 2) the linguistic model’s emphasis on the communicative and 
reciprocal nature of speech acts can be used to address a particular criticism of Fricker’s account 
of the second type of epistemic injustice: hermeneutical injustice. However, before addressing 
this criticism, I must first offer a brief account of the linguistic model of silencing. 
1.3 The Linguistic Model of Silencing 
In “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts” (1993), Rae Langton takes up the concerns of 
feminist theorists regarding the silencing effect that pornography has on women.2 She places this 
issue in the context of speech act theory, whereby an utterance constitutes a particular kind of 
                                                 
2 Notable among feminist theorists on this topic is Catharine MacKinnon. 
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action. This notion of speech acts applies to pornography in that Langton characterizes 
pornography as both a kind of speech and a kind of act—and thus: a speech act. She writes 
succinctly in the opening paragraph:  
Pornography is speech. So the courts declared in judging it protected by the First 
Amendment. Pornography is a kind of act. So Catharine MacKinnon declared in 
arguing for laws against it. Put these together and we have: pornography is a kind 
of speech act. (Langton 1993:293) 
 
This prompts the question, then: what kind of speech act is pornography and how does it 
contribute to the silencing of women?  To answer this question, Langton appeals to J.L. Austin’s 
distinctions between three different types of speech acts: locution (i.e., the content of an 
utterance), illocution (i.e., the action constituted by the utterance), and perlocution (i.e., the effect 
of the utterance) (Langton 1993:295). Using this terminology, Langton argues that not only does 
pornography depict and consequently perpetuate the subordination of women, but it itself 
performs the illocutionary act of subordinating women—thus, she characterizes silencing as 
illocutionary disablement. According to Langton, pornography silences women—via 
illocutionary disablement—because it has the authority to issue certain illocutionary demands—
that is, “rank[ing] women as sex objects [and] legitimat[ing] sexual violence” (Langton 
1993:307). Similarly, those in other positions of power may have the authority to issue 
subordinating speech acts. For instance, Langton points to the utterance, “Blacks are not 
permitted to vote” (1993:302). When uttered by a legislator in Apartheid-era South Africa, this 
speech act has an illocutionary force, which serves to subordinate blacks—thus “a speech act 
[can] be an illocutionary act of subordination” (1993:302). 
 So, presupposing that pornography (or perhaps more generally, the patriarchal societal 
structure out of which it has developed) does in fact have the authority perform this illocutionary 
  7 
act of subordination, it leads to the illocutionary disablement of women.3 This is because the 
power differential between speakers and hearers in this context is so unequal, women as 
speakers—having been subordinated and objectified—are not even in enough of a position of 
authority to be able to perform certain very important illocutionary acts. The communicative 
relation between speaker and hearer has been undermined so severely, the hearer does not (or 
even cannot) properly take up what the speaker has done in saying something. Paradigmatically, 
the illocutionary speech act of refusal that a woman performs in uttering the locution “No” in 
response to an unwanted sexual advance is not properly taken up by the hearer. In contrast with 
pornography’s authority to illocutionarily subordinate women, it is the woman’s lack of authority 
to refuse sexual advances, in this case, that prevents her “No” from being taken up as a genuine 
act of refusal—thus, her illocution has been silenced. 
 
2. Silencing as Locutionary Disablement in Hermeneutical Injustice 
2.1 Overview of Hermeneutical Injustice 
With both the epistemic and linguistic models of silencing in mind now, I will explain 
how silencing might occur in cases of the second type of epistemic injustice that Fricker 
describes: hermeneutical injustice. Though Fricker explains silencing only within the context of 
testimonial injustice, I propose that silencing can occur in cases of hermeneutical injustice as 
well, and it is in these cases that the linguistic model of silencing can help address the criticism 
that Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice is guilty of a certain epistemic hegemony. First, 
                                                 
3 Whether or not pornography itself has the sort of authority that Langton and those like MacKinnon claim it does is 
a source of considerable debate. I am inclined to think that it is not pornography alone that issues such subordinating 
demands, but rather the larger cultural framework that eroticizes the objectification and subordination of women; 
that is, pornography is just one of many institutions that derives its authority to issue such illocutions from the 
authoritative patriarchal structure of society. Though this debate is itself worthy of investigation, for my purposes, I 
am concerned primarily with the second part of Langton’s paper, which focuses more specifically on the 
phenomenon of silencing in women—in particular, their failure to perform certain illocutionary acts—rather than the 
power of pornography to silence. 
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however, a brief overview of Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice is required. Fricker 
writes: “Hermeneutical injustice is: the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social 
experience obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the 
collective hermeneutical resource” (Fricker 2007:155).  
To illustrate a paradigmatic case of hermeneutical injustice, Fricker points to the 
phenomenon of “sexual harassment.” She explains in the case of the phenomenon of sexual 
harassment: prior to the introduction of the term “sexual harassment,” women who experienced 
what we now call sexual harassment suffered a hermeneutical injustice. They suffered such an 
injustice because they were unable to make sense of and articulate what it was they were 
experiencing at the hands of men and other superiors in the workplace. For women, this definite, 
but yet unnamed, experience was so unintelligible and inarticulable even to themselves, that this 
frustration often manifested itself in both psychological and physical symptoms. Once women 
began the practice of consciousness raising, acknowledging that something was happening to 
them, but prior to actually having the term “sexual harassment” at their disposal to describe their 
experience of it, it was the case that: “‘[t]he ‘this’ they were going to break the silence about had 
no name.’ […] Here is a story about how extant collective hermeneutical resources can have a 
lacuna where the name of a distinctive social experience should be” (Fricker 2007:150).4 In other 
words, I suggest, women lacked the meaningful locution—“sexual harassment”—to 
communicate their experience. In this sense, then, I propose that hermeneutical injustice can 




                                                 
4 Brownmiller in In Our Time, 280-281, as quoted by Fricker. 
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2.2 Locutionary Disablement 
Remember that, “[t]o perform a locutionary act is to utter a sentence that has a particular 
meaning, as traditionally conceived” (Langton 1993:295). When an individual is excluded from 
the hermeneutical framework determined by the dominant cultural power, she may lack even the 
ability to perform the locutionary act of expressing her thoughts intelligibly. Langton addresses 
the possibility of what I am now calling locutionary disablement when considering which type of 
speech act (i.e., locution, illocution, or perlocution) is in play when silencing occurs. She writes:  
At the first and most basic level, members of a powerless group may be silent 
because they are intimidated, or because they believe that no one will listen. They 
do not protest at all, because they fear the guns. In such cases, no words are 
uttered at all. In Austin’s terms, speakers fail to perform even a locutionary act. 
(1993:315) 
 
It is not necessarily the case that a member of a marginalized group is literally (i.e., physically) 
prevented from speaking, but in any case, they are silenced in the sense that their political 
circumstances render them unable to communicate because the cost of speaking is too high. The 
problem is not only that the proper uptake has not been secured, in that the action performed in a 
particular illocution has misfired (for instance, an act of refusal in the utterance of “no” is taken 
as an act of consent). Rather, in the cases to which Langton refers, the marginalized member is 
prevented from speaking at all.  
Being prevented from speaking or lacking a particular locution, however, are just two 
ways in which one can be locutionarily disabled. I suggest that another way of being 
locutionarily disabled is to be excluded from participating in a shared language or conceptual 
framework (i.e., Fricker’s “collective hermeneutical resource”).5 If I am correct in arguing that 
                                                 
5 Throughout the remainder of this paper, I will use such terms as “linguistic framework,” 
“conceptual framework,” and “hermeneutical framework” roughly interchangeably to describe 
the frameworks under which one articulates their concepts and experiences through language. 
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locutionary disablement can and does occur (in addition to illocutionary disablement), then it is 
reasonable to suggest that there may also be different types of locutionary disablement, given 
that Austin identifies three distinctions among locutionary acts. Summarizing this account of 
locutionary acts, Austin writes:  
We […] made three rough distinctions between the phonetic act, the phatic act, 
and the rhetic act. The phonetic act is merely the act of uttering certain noises. 
The phatic act is the uttering of certain vocables and words, i.e. noises of certain 
types, belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary, conforming to and 
as conforming to a certain grammar. The rhetic act is the performance of an act 
using those vocables with a certain more-or-less definite sense and reference. 
(Austin 1962:95) 
 
Like illocutionary acts, Austin argues, locutionary acts are subject to failure—but they are 
subject to failure in an importantly different way: “failures [of locutionary acts] will not be 
unhappinesses as [in illocutionary acts], but rather failures to get the words out, to express 
ourselves clearly, etc.” (1962:106). “Failures to get the words out,” then, might be characterized 
as a failure of phonetic acts, while failures “to express ourselves clearly” might be characterized 
as a failure of either phatic acts or rhetic acts. Such failures seem to accurately describe the 
various cases of locutionary disablement I consider throughout this paper. In the case of being 
prevented from speaking or lacking a particular locution, one is locutionarily disabled—but in 
particular, one is phonetically disabled, because she fails to perform “the act of uttering certain 
noises.” This is just what occurred in the case of sexual harassment, when women did not even 
have the words to articulate what they were experiencing. Not having the words can have 
significant ramifications, particularly in cases in which being able to articulate one’s complaint 
can determine one’s legal options: you cannot sue for sexual harassment unless the term “sexual 
harassment” exists in the first place. So in the case of sexual harassment, the hermeneutical 
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injustice that women suffered was characterized by phonetic disablement. However, as I will 
argue in relation to Rachel Jeantel’s case, one can also be phatically disabled.6 
2.3 Jeantel, revisited 
Let’s return now to the opening case of Rachel Jeantel. Clearly, Jeantel suffered a 
testimonial injustice, similar to the (fictional) example of Tom Robinson from To Kill A 
Mockingbird that Fricker utilizes to illustrate testimonial injustice. In Fricker’s often used 
example, she explains that Tom Robinson’s testimony is deemed not credible by a jury of whites 
as a result of systematic prejudice towards blacks. In the case of Rachel Jeantel, however, I want 
to argue, that she was also a victim of hermeneutical injustice, given the emphasis not just what 
she said, but the way in which she spoke in her testimony: besides the blatantly racist ridicule 
leveled against her appearance and demeanor, Jeantel’s use of language was harshly criticized as 
well. Perhaps given that her first language was Haitian Creole, and not English, confusion 
regarding her speech was partly understandable. However, this was not simply a case of 
language barriers, because had she spoken an entirely different language than English in her 
testimony, as opposed to a dialect, she would have been given a translator:  
Since one cannot restrict witnesses to those who speak fluent standard English 
[…] it is up to jurors and the court to make greater efforts to understand them. 
The problem is exacerbated for speakers of English dialects, who do not get 
access to translators as witnesses from foreign language backgrounds do. 
(Rickford 2014) 
 
So while it is perfectly understandable that we might often encounter problems regarding 
language translation in our globalized society, that more effort was not made to understand 
Jeantel’s English dialect in an American courtroom shows that systematic prejudice was 
certainly at play. Jeantel’s use of AAVE was likely disregarded because it represented a 
                                                 
6 While, presumably, one may also be rhetically disabled, I will not explore that possibility in depth here. The 
accounts of phonetic and phatic disablement will, I think, suffice for illustrating that there are at least two different 
ways in which one might be locutionarily disabled. 
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deviation from standard (that is, “superior”) English: “As is often the case, particularly in formal 
settings, unfamiliarity with and negative attitudes toward vernacular speech rendered Jeantel 
simply ignorant in the eyes of the jury – and therefore not a credible witness” (Rickford 2014). 
That Jeantel’s credibility as a witness (as relates to testimony) was inextricably bound up with 
negative attitudes towards her speech (as relates to the cultural hermeneutical framework), 
suggests that she was a victim of both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, as construed by 
Fricker.  
Given that we are socially situated beings, the feelings and experiences that we are able 
to express are made expressible and intelligible through hermeneutical frameworks that provide 
us with language and concepts. But since not all of us actually share these same frameworks—as 
we have just seen in the case of Rachel Jeantel—communication across different frameworks can 
be impeded when no attempts are made to bridge the interpretive gap between the frameworks. 
This usually occurs when one framework is seen by the politically dominant group as inferior to 
their own (for instance, English dialects seen as inferior to “standard” English). Fricker herself 
notes that it is not just a matter of having a specific phrase (i.e. locution) such as “sexual 
harassment” to articulate one’s experience that is necessary in order to avoid hermeneutical 
injustice. In addition to having a particular locution at one’s disposal, one must also have access 
to the entire conceptual and linguistic framework in order to make one’s experience 
intelligible—perhaps to themselves and certainly to others—within a society: 
[W]e must recognize that a hermeneutical gap might equally concern not (or not 
only) the content but rather the form of what can be said. Thus the characteristic 
expressive style of a given social group may be rendered just as much of an unfair 
hindrance to their communicative efforts as interpretive absence can be. 
(2007:160) 
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But which expressive styles count as intelligible within a collective hermeneutical framework? 
The answer to this question exposes an unintended and problematic aspect of Fricker’s account 
that apparently ignores the significance of non-dominant hermeneutical frameworks for self-
understanding by members of marginalized groups, and betrays her own commitment to 
challenging epistemic hegemony.  
In addressing this apparent blind spot in Fricker’s account, I claim that the nature of the 
hermeneutical injustice perpetrated against Jeantel extends beyond the form of hermeneutical 
injustice that Fricker articulates. Specifically, I argue that the hermeneutical injustice that Jeantel 
suffered includes the specific form of locutionary disablement (in particular phatic disablement). 
Further, my account allows us to maintain that Jeantel was both locutionarily and illocutionarily 
disabled since, as Austin (1962:147) claims, there is generally a great deal of overlap between 
locutionary and illocutionary acts, therefore my account of silencing is compatible with Langton 
and Hornsby’s account. However, by looking at the case of Rachel Jeantel specifically as a case 
of locutionary disablement, the way in which the reciprocal communicative relation between 
speaker and hearer was undermined becomes even more striking. There is not even a possibility 
of proper uptake, when the hearer does not even understand the locution. It is no surprise that 
Jeantel was illocuationary disabled (in that what she was trying to do in saying something (her 
illocutionary act) was unsuccessful, given that the content of what she was trying to say did not 
rise to the level of successful locution. In the eyes (or rather, ears) of her interlocutors, Jeantel’s 
testimony failed the phatic level. Jeantel was phatically disabled because although she spoke 
words that were mostly recognizable as English, her grammatical constructions were not (they 
were the grammatical constructions of AAVE). However, one might think it unfair to suggest 
that Jeantel was phatically disabled, given that she was able to peform phatic acts within the 
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context of her own dialect. But somehow, she still did not succeed in communicating, suggesting 
that her phatic acts were less than fully successful. This, I think, demonstrates the 
communicative nature of language described by Jennifer Hornsby.  
Hornsby argues that any philosophical account of language must include the fact that it is 
fundamentally communicative, and thus the hearer is just as essential as the speaker. As she 
explains:  
Philosophers who think in isolation about language make an assumption about the 
self-sufficiency of the individual language user. […] The philosopher who thinks 
about language in abstraction from use forgets about its function: he forgets what 
sentences are for. Sentences of course are for communicating with. Thus we make 
the function of language evident if we accord a central role to saying something to 
another in the explication of linguistic meaning. (2000:8) 
 
Jeantel’s experience may very well have been obscured from the “collective” 
understanding of the dominant groups (i.e., White men) in the courtroom, but it was not obscured 
from her own understanding. She spoke in, and had full command of, the dialect in which she 
was raised. That the public responded with such outrage and confusion demonstrates ignorance 
on their part, not on Jeantel’s part. This suggests that Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice 
is inadequate in accounting for all of the consequences of being excluded from a hermeneutical 
framework. 
2.4 Criticism of Fricker’s Hermeneutical Injustice 
It is problematic to suggest that by virtue of being excluded from the dominant 
hermeneutical framework, Jeantel was “prevent[ed] from understanding a significant area of her 
social experience, thus depriving her of an important patch of self-understanding” (Fricker 
2007:149). Jeantel, in fact, had a hermeneutical framework through which she could articulate 
her experience, but it was not recognized as intelligible by those operating within the politically 
and culturally dominant (i.e., White) hermeneutical framework. Contrary to Fricker’s account 
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then, just because a marginalized group speaks a less dominant dialect of a language, this does 
not mean that they are necessarily always victims of hermeneutical injustice—at least, that is, in 
terms of an obfuscation of self-understanding. This would delegitimize important forms of 
cultural expression and linguistic practice, which is precisely the unjust dominant viewpoint that 
Fricker herself emphatically criticizes.  
As Rebecca Mason (2011), José Medina (2012), and Kristie Dotson (2012) all point out, 
this exposes a blind spot in Fricker’s construal of hermeneutical injustice. Fricker appears to 
ignore the possibility that while a marginalized group may be excluded from the dominant 
hermeneutical resource, this does not entail that the group’s subjects lack self-understanding or 
self-intelligibility from the perspective of their own culture’s hermeneutical resource: 
[W]ith and through the development of new expressive and interpretive resources, 
hermeneutically marginalized subjects can eventually achieve understanding of 
their obscured experiences while they may still remain systematically 
misunderstood by others (some others) when they try to communicate about those 
experiences. In these cases the hermeneutical injustice continues even after the 
lack of self-understanding disappears, which shows that the problem goes deeper 
and concerns not only a deficient self-understanding, but also and more 
fundamentally a precarious and unequal relation to expressive and interpretive 
practices in which experiences are shared with others. (Medina 2012:207) 
 
So as Medina explains above, being unable to participate within the dominant hermeneutical 
framework does not preclude self-knowledge or intelligibility. But this exclusion does prevent 
the successful performance of certain speech acts, particularly at the level of locution, because it 
interferes with the requisite conditions of reciprocity in the speaker-hearer relationship. As 
Hornsby explains: 
“What reciprocity ensures is only that hearers are such as to recognize speaker’s 
speech as it is meant to be taken. It ensures that in ordinary cases of linguistic 
communication, there is something a speaker has done which both is overt (not 
concealed by the speaker) and is transparent (not hidden from hearers)” (Hornsby 
2003) 
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The hearer, just as much as the speaker herself, needs to understand what the speaker is saying 
(locution) and what the speaker is doing in saying it (illocution). When the hearer fails to 
understand what the speaker says because he operates within a dominant linguistic framework, 
while the speaker operates within a marginalized linguistic framework, this is still a case of 
epistemic injustice in some sense even if the speaker does not lack self-understanding, as is 
seemingly required in the case of hermeneutical injustice. So while Jeantel’s vocabulary and 
grammar were in fact the internally consistent vocabulary and grammar of AAVE, that her 
interlocutors in the courtroom were unable (or unwilling) to understand her demonstrates the 
significance of the reciprocal speaker-hearer relationship in successful communication. Like 
Hornsby, Kristie Dotson emphasizes the importance of the speaker-hearer relationship in 
communication, explaining: “Speakers require audiences to ‘meet’ their effort ‘halfway’ in a 
linguistic exchange” (2011:238). In cases like those of Jeantel, her audience, operating within a 
dominant linguistic framework, proved unwilling to meet her communicative efforts halfway in 
accommodating her linguistic diversity; that they did not demonstrates that racist attitudes 
regarding the value and intelligibility of non-dominant dialects such as AAVE played a role in 
their response to her testimony. 
2.5 The Upshot of Locutionary Disablement 
In sum: while Langton and Hornsby propose an account of silencing as illocutionary 
disablement, it appears that in cases when one operates within a non-dominant hermeneutical 
framework, silencing can occur even at the locutionary level: that is, the ability of members of 
politically marginalized social groups is impeded to such an extent, that communication between 
dominant and non-dominant groups can become nearly impossible. Remember that the ability to 
perform locutionary act can be construed as the ability to say anything at all. In cases of language 
  17 
or dialect barriers, a speaker is unable to communicate a particular locution to a hearer because 
the hearer simply does not understand the meaning of that utterance. The speaker, in effect, has 
not communicated anything because the reciprocal relation between speaker and hearer does not 
hold. In this sense, then, the speaker has been silenced in a way considered neither by Langton 
and Hornsby (in that it is locutionary, as opposed to illocutionary), nor by Fricker (in that it 
follows the a linguistic model of silencing, as opposed to just the epistemic model). Additionally, 
while this silencing occurs within the realm of hermeneutical injustice, it is a different form of 
hermeneutical injustice than the one Fricker has identified (or, as I will suggest, a different type 
of epistemic injustice altogether). 
 There is nothing inherently unjust, however, in being unable to communicate a particular 
locution. Language barriers impede communication all the time. It is only when this sort of 
communicative dysfunction occurs as a result of unjust imbalances in social power that it 
becomes problematic. When this is the case, we must look at the political and historical 
circumstances that govern what language counts as “intelligible” to “collective” understanding. 
Even what can be communicated at the locutionary level is a political matter, as different cultural 
frameworks will dictate which locutions are deemed intelligible. Which frameworks come to 
dominate is a historical, political, and, as we will see, philosophical issue, that bears on the 
relation between individuals’ epistemic capacities and their humanity. 
 
3. A Third Type of Epistemic Injustice 
3.1 Interpretive Burdens 
As I have just argued, it is not necessarily the case that one lacks self-understanding when 
one is excluded from the dominant hermeneutical framework. But it is the case that the 
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communication of meaningful locutions between groups can be greatly inhibited. So the harm of 
silencing via locutionary disablement persists in many cases of hermeneutical injustice, although 
the harm of the lack of self-understanding may not. Bridging the interpretive gap between a 
marginalized framework and a dominant framework, then, requires effort on the part of the 
dominant group of hearers to recognize the historical and philosophical precedent for devaluing 
the speech and modes of expression of marginalized groups, and to deliberately push back 
against this precedent—as deliberately as this precedent was established in the first place. 
Unfortunately though, this interpretive burden usually falls upon the shoulders of marginalized 
group. Rather than the dominant group reconsidering and actively reversing its prejudicial 
attitudes toward the hermeneutical frameworks of marginalized groups and learning to interpret 
frameworks different from their own, it is the marginalized group that must master navigating 
through the dominant framework to make themselves understood, or risk dehumanization or 
worse: “Often for their very survival, blacks have been forced to become lay anthropologists, 
studying the strange culture, customs and mind-set of the ‘white tribe’ that has such frightening 
power over them” (Mills 2007:17). That marginalized groups often must struggle to make 
themselves understood in this way—not to themselves, but to the dominant power—suggests that 
there may be a third type of epistemic injustice, beyond testimonial injustice and hermeneutical 
injustice (though importantly related to features of both). In what follows, I will articulate this 
distinct, third form of epistemic injustice—what I will call the epistemic injustice of interpretive 
burden. 
3.2 Structural Epistemic Ignorance 
Recall Fricker’s definition of hermeneutical injustice: “Hermeneutical injustice is: the 
injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective 
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understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource” 
(Fricker 2007:155). I propose that this third type of epistemic injustice occurs similarly when a 
“significant area of one’s social experience [is] obscured.” But unlike hermeneutical injustice, it 
is not the case that it is obscured from “collective understanding”—as what counts as 
“collective” is itself a politically loaded question. Instead, such injustice occurs when a 
“significant area of one’s social experience” is obscured specifically from the understanding of 
the dominant group. Thus, this type of epistemic injustice goes hand in hand with epistemic 
ignorance on the part of the dominant group. 
As Linda Alcoff (2007) explains, this epistemic ignorance on the part of the dominant 
group, along with practices of dehumanization, form a necessary condition for systematic 
oppression to occur—for, it is thought, a dominant society that takes itself (through a sort of self-
deception) to be just surely would not engage in such practices as colonization and enslavement 
in the first place. Alcoff summarizes this line of thought, which she attributes to Mills as the 
structural argument, as follows: 
1. One of the key features of oppressive societies is that they do not acknowledge 
themselves as oppressive. Therefore, in any given oppressive society, there is a 
dominant view about the general nature of the society that represents its particular 
forms of inequality and exploitation as basically just and fair, or at least the best 
of all possible worlds.  
2. It is very likely, however, that this dominant representation of the unjust society 
as a just society will have countervailing evidence on a daily basis that is at least 
potentially visible to everyone in the society.  
3. Therefore, cognitive norms of assessment will have to be maintained that allow 
for this countervailing evidence to be regularly dismissed so that the dominant 
view can be held stable. (2007:48)  
 
Not only, then, does the dominant group have a vested interest in the privileging of their own 
“cognitive norms of assessment”, but this actually requires a willful epistemic ignorance that can 
only be achieved through deliberate practices of dehumanization.  
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In what follows, I will illustrate—through reference to Mills’s The Racial Contract 
(1997)—how the political system of white supremacy has operated in just this way to perpetrate 
and perpetuate a significant hermeneutical injustice—particularly of the sort associated with 
silencing as locutionary disablement—through the privileging of the white European 
hermeneutical framework. In not recognizing certain hermeneutical frameworks as legitimate, 
dominant groups perpetually deny the humanity of marginalized groups by denying their status 
as knowers and speakers. 
3.3 Silencing and Dehumanization 
Returning briefly to Langton’s and Fricker’s respective accounts of silencing—though 
they approach the issue of silencing from different philosophical areas—both agree that silencing 
constitutes a harm with regard to its effect on the cognitive capacities that are constitutive of 
one’s humanity. For Langton and Hornsby: 
Possession of this capacity (which is to participate in illocution)—not just of the 
ability to produce intelligible sounds and marks (which is to participate in 
locution)—is necessary for any individual to flourish as a knowledgeable human 
being, and for the spread of knowledge across populations and generations of 
individuals. (1998:37) 
  
And for Fricker: “To be wronged in one’s capacity as a knower is to be wronged in a capacity 
essential to human value. When one is undermined or otherwise wronged in a capacity essential 
to human value, one suffers an intrinsic injustice” (2007:44). Again, though, remember that 
Fricker prefers the epistemic model “because it requires less erosion of women’s human status 
before the silencing effect kicks in” (2007:142). However, it is this precise erosion of human 
status (i.e., dehumanization) that characterizes many occurrences of silencing of marginalized 
groups, especially when entire hermeneutical frameworks are deemed unintelligible by the 
dominant power.  
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Given this dehumanizing element of silencing, it will be helpful to explore how, 
historically, hermeneutical injustices have arisen precisely through dehumanizing practices and 
philosophical justifications. Further, an account of silencing as locutionary disablement 
illustrates particularly well how both marginalized groups and their associated expressive and 
linguistic practices are deliberately devalued to the point that such practices are barely registered 
as language at all by the dominant group. A close look at The Racial Contract (1997), in 
particular, will help draw out the ways in which willful epistemic ignorance on the part of the 
dominant group works alongside dehumanizing practices in order to strip marginalized groups of 
the legitimacy of their hermeneutical frameworks, and thus, silencing them via locutionary 
disablement. 
3.4 The Racial Contract and Epistemic Injustice 
In The Racial Contract, Mills draws on social contract theory and argues that in addition 
to the social contract, there has been an implicit (and oftentimes explicit) racial contract that has 
historically existed (and still currently exists) alongside the social contract. The racial contract, in 
fact, is far more real than any theoretical social contract, as it describes the actual history and 
perpetuation of white dominance over non-white populations. Briefly: the racial contract, like the 
social contract, describes the way in which society has been organized and attempts to justify its 
formation and structure. However, while the racial contract does describe the way in which white 
dominance became established over nonwhite populations, it does not actually endorse the 
justification for this political arrangement; rather, “it does normative work for us not through its 
own values, which are detestable, but by enabling us to understand the polity’s actual history and 
how these values and concepts have functioned to rationalize oppression, so as to reform them” 
(Mills 1997:6). Of course, while this paper does not engage with social contract theory, Mills’s 
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account is significant in that he presents a particular history of domination, which vividly 
illustrates not just the emergence of the racial contract, but also the emergence of systemic 
epistemic injustice. Importantly, Mills focuses largely on the epistemic dimension of the racial 
contract—that is, the epistemic norms and cognitive requirements that the signatories of the 
contract must satisfy: “the Racial Contract [is] epistemological, prescribing norms for cognition 
to which its signatories must adhere” (1997:11). This epistemological dimension of the racial 
contract is just where epistemic injustices occur. 
According to Mills, the racial contract contains a distinctly epistemic element in that it 
restricts the possibility of knowledge to a subset of humans—in this case, White Europeans:  
The epistemological dimension is the corollary of the preemptive restriction of 
knowledge to European cognizers, which implies that in certain spaces real 
knowledge (knowledge of science, universals) is not possible. Significant cultural 
achievement, intellectual progress, is thus denied to these spaces, which are 
deemed (failing European intervention), to be permanently locked into a cognitive 
state of superstition and ignorance. (1997:44) 
 
This denial of one’s capacity as a knower (to use Fricker’s terminology) was then used as 
justification for the deliberate dehumanization of nonwhite populations. As Mills observes, this 
dehumanization was quite literal and, indeed, systematic: 
In the slavery contract […] the terms of the contract require of the slave an 
ongoing self-negation of personhood, an acceptance of chattel status […] Thus, in 
the Caribbean and on the mainland of the Americas, there were sites where newly 
arrived Africans were sometimes taken to be ‘seasoned’ before being transported 
to the plantations. And this was basically the metaphysical transforming them 
from persons into subpersons of the chattel variety. (1997:84) 
 
This literal dehumanization reflects Fricker’s notion of epistemic objectification in that a 
speaker/potential knower is downgraded in his status from subject to mere source of information 
(if that). Further, this process of dehumanization and objectification actually requires a great deal 
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of conceptualization and reconceptualization of the requirements for personhood, on both the 
part of the dominant white culture and subordinate nonwhite culture. Mills goes on: 
This project requires labor at both ends, involving the development of a 
depersonizing conceptual apparatus through which whites must learn to see 
nonwhites and also, crucially, through which nonwhites must learn to see 
themselves. For the nonwhites, then this is something like the intellectual 
equivalent of the physical process of ‘seasoning,’ ‘slave breaking,’ the aim being 
to produce an entity who accepts subpersonhood. (1997:87) 
 
Crucially, Mills points out that under the auspices of ideal theory itself, nonwhites have been 
systematically denied the cognitive status required to take part in such theorizing.7 And because 
it has historically been whites who have set the framework and norms for conducting ideal 
theory, nonwhites are not only left out of the conversation, but they are rendered unable to even 
potentially participate in this new framework into which they have been unwillingly thrust. This 
is because they lack the requisite conceptual framework and associated conceptual skills that 
have been delineated by the dominant group of theorizers: 
[C]oncepts are crucial to cognition: cognitive scientists point out that they help us 
to categorize, learn, remember, infer, explain, problem-solve, generalize, 
analogize. Correspondingly, the lack of appropriate concepts can hinder learning, 
interfere with memory, block inferences, obstruct explanation, and perpetuate 
problems.” (1997:6) 
  
At first, this sounds strikingly like a paradigmatic case of hermeneutical injustice (like that of 
sexual harassment) as originally construed by Fricker. That this system of white dominance over 
nonwhites dictates the terms of that collective understanding means that those (nonwhites) who 
have been deliberately and perpetually excluded might end up lacking the conceptual resources 
to understand their own social experiences in terms of the dominant hermeneutical framework. 
However, as I have argued earlier, this exclusion from the dominant framework need not 
                                                 
7 While I do not intend to go into depth regarding the ideal vs. non-ideal theory debate in this paper, I mention Mills 
position on it because his criticism of ideal theory is conceptually linked with his criticism of those objective stances 
purportedly claimed to be taken up by dominant groups of theorizers. 
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necessarily result in an obscuring of self-understanding. Further, this “lack of appropriate 
concepts,” which “can hinder learning interfere with memory, block inferences, obstruct 
explanation, and perpetuate problems” (Mills 1997:6) can affect those operating within the 
dominant hermeneutical framework just as much as it can affect those operating within the 
marginalized hermeneutical framework.  
As we have seen (for instance, in the case of Rachel Jeantel), this lack of familiarity with 
and willful ignorance of different hermeneutical frameworks certainly “perpetuates problems” 
(to put it mildly!). Paradoxically though, as both Mills and Alcoff point out, this is usually to the 
benefit of the dominant group and to the detriment of the marginalized group, demonstrating that 
we are, in fact, dealing with injustice. Kristie Dotson identifies yet another type of epistemic 
injustice associated with epistemic ignorance, which she calls contributory injustice. She writes: 
“Contributory injustice is caused by an epistemic agent’s situated ignorance, in the form of 
willful hermeneutical ignorance, in maintaining and utilizing structurally prejudiced 
hermeneutical resources that result in epistemic harm to the epistemic agency of a knower” 
(2012:31). My own articulation of a third type of epistemic injustice is similar to Dotson’s in that 
it essentially involves epistemic ignorance on the part of the dominant group, but it extends to a 
particular consequence of this ignorance, which arises in cases when the dominant group is 
attempting to overcome its ignorance. Specifically, we end up dealing with the epistemic 
injustice of interpretive burden, because even when genuine attempts to overcome epistemic 
ignorance eradicate the first two types of epistemic injustice are made, communication between 
groups can still be seriously impeded—and it is usually members of the marginalized group that 
must struggle to make their language and concepts intelligible to the dominant group, rather than 
the other way around.  
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3.5 More Interpretive Burdens and ‘White Feminism’ 
Ironically, it is often the case that marginalized groups are subject to the interpretative 
burden of making themselves understood to others—the third type of epistemic injustice that I 
have identified—in the very attempts to ameliorate the former types of epistemic injustice. We 
see this in the criticism of white feminists by feminists of color: the same problems of White-
dominated theory, as have been illustrated in The Racial Contract, are to a certain extent 
repeated when the dominant group of feminist theorists (i.e., white) dictate the language and 
conceptual framework of the theory. This leads to the exclusion of the voices —and thus, again, 
silencing—of women of color. In many cases, the interpretive burden placed on women of color 
is due to language barriers, such as the barrier between Spanish and English. As María Lugones 
explains: 
(In an Hispana voice) 
[…] 
We and you do not talk in the same language. When we talk to you we use your 
language: the language of your experience and of your theories. We try to use it to 
communicate our world of experience. But since your language and your theories 
are inadequate in expressing our experiences, we only succeed in communicating 
our experience of exclusion. We cannot talk to you in your language because you 
do not understand it. So the brute facts that we understand your language and that 
the place where most theorizing about women is taking place is your place, both 
combine to require that we either use your language and distort our experience not 
just in speaking about it, but in the living of it, or that we remain silent. 
Complaining about exclusion is a way of remaining silent. (1983:575) 
 
Though I remarked earlier that there is nothing inherently unjust in being unable to communicate 
a particular locution due to language barriers, upon closer examination of the actual language 
barriers that often impede valuable and constructive dialogue between feminists of different 
backgrounds it becomes clear that not making an effort to understand another’s language 
suggests epistemic ignorance on the part of the hearer—the same sort of epistemic ignorance 
historically practiced by the dominant White power. Such ignorance subjects the speaker to this 
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third form of epistemic injustice—the epistemic injustice of interpretive burden—whereby she 
must struggle to make herself understood, even when white feminists sincerely seek to 
understand the experiences of women of color. 
The consequences of this reverberate beyond the realm of theory and into areas of lived 
experience—for example, in the legal system, as we have seen with Rachel Jeantel. Even in a 
setting in which communicating one’s experience (or rather, not being able to communicate 
one’s experience) to others is essential for the carrying out of justice—i.e., in the courtroom—
there are both blatant and more subtle attempts to further silence marginalized groups. Perhaps, 
given the history of white supremacy, it is unsurprising that epistemic injustice would persist in 
these institutional and legal domains. As both Mills and Alcoff have explained, such institutions 
were designed to perpetrate, and at the same time erase evidence of, injustice. Jeantel had to 
struggle to make herself understood—a struggle that proved unsuccessful—but she did so in a 
system that was never meant to understand her in the first place (that is, a system dominated by 
White men). 
However, what is perhaps more concerning than the continued willful epistemic 
ignorance of dominant groups is that even those with good intentions, as in the case of feminists, 
often continue to perpetrate epistemic injustice—particularly the epistemic injustice of 
interpretive burden—in their theorizing. The voices and experiences of women of color are often 
excluded—and thus, silenced—from narratives presented in mainstream, white-dominated 
feminism. Though this problem has been largely acknowledged within third-wave feminism, and 
more of an effort has been made to understand the distinct life experiences of those who occupy 
various intersecting marginalized identities, again, this task generally falls upon the shoulders of 
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women of color to teach and explain to white feminists the nature of their experiences of 
oppression. 
White feminists can be, and often are, caught up in the same practice of epistemic 
ignorance that has persisted since the early days of the racial contract. Mariana Ortega explains: 
“I emphasize the dangerous terrain white feminists traverse when they claim to be concerned 
about women of color while at the same time being fully engaged in production of ignorance 
about the lives of these women” (2006:48). Not only do white feminists claim to be concerned 
about women of color, but in their attempts to practice a more inclusive and pluralistic feminism, 
they often demand that women of color exhaust their own epistemic and emotional resources in 
explaining their own oppression—a phenomenon that Nora Berenstain calls epistemic 
exploitation (2016). It is clearly the case, then, that substantial changes need to be made to the 
way feminist theory has historically been conducted. In the following section, I will gesture at 
what sorts of approaches might contribute to a more just feminism, with an eye towards the 
importance of reciprocity. 
Because those engaged in such theory purportedly aim to dismantle the very oppressive 
and unjust systems that lead to epistemic injustice in the first place, it is of the utmost importance 
to the success of both their theoretical and practical efforts to take up a good share of the 
interpretive burden unjustly imposed on women of color. This is a particularly deliberate task of 
dismantling because, as we have seen, the historical circumstances by which such silencing arose 
in the first place were themselves politically and philosophically deliberate—that is, making the 
marginalized group’s hermeneutical framework unintelligible was part of the very process of 
dehumanization and domination. It speaks to the insidious nature of this centuries-long history of 
injustice that even those with the good intention of ending epistemic injustice risk reinforcing it. 
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3.6 Reciprocity in Overcoming Ignorance and Injustice 
 The positive project for a truly inclusive and pluralistic feminism that avoids perpetrating 
epistemic injustice of any type requires bridging the interpretive gap among groups of women 
occupying various positions of social power, without unfairly burdening those who already face 
the many types of epistemic injustice. However, bridging this gap does not mean totally 
eradicating differences in order to achieve an even playing field upon which successful 
communication may take place. But I do want to return to the notion of reciprocity, as articulated 
earlier by Hornsby. Fundamentally, I want to emphasize the importance of reciprocity in 
dialogue amongst feminists of various backgrounds. In this sense, I am in agreement with 
Lugones and Spelman, who write, “Our suggestion in this paper, and at this time it is no more 
than a suggestion, is that only when genuine and reciprocal dialogue takes place between 
‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ can we trust the outsider’s account” (1983:577). However, like 
Lugones and Spelman, I acknowledge that what this reciprocity might look like is itself a 
complicated matter: “If white/Anglo women and women are color are to do theory jointly, in 
helpful, respectful, illuminating and empowering ways, the task ahead of white/Anglo women 
because of this asymmetry, is a very hard task. The task is a very complex one. In part, to make 
an analogy, the task can be compared to learning a text without the aid of teachers” (1983:580). 
But ultimately, Lugones and Spelman suggest: 
[T]he motive of friendship remains as both the only appropriate and 
understandable motive for white/Anglo feminists engaging in the task [of joint 
theory], then you will be moved to attain the  appropriate reciprocity of 
understanding that will enable to you follow us in our experiences as we are able 
to follow you in yours. (1983:581) 
  
In a later paper, Lugones describes this practice of following one another in each other’s 
experiences as “world travelling”: 
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One can “travel” between […] “worlds” and one can inhabit more than one of 
these “worlds” at the very same time. I think that most of us who are outside the 
mainstream of, for example, the U.S. dominant construction or organization of 
life are “world travellers” as a matter of necessity and of survival. It seems to me 
that inhabiting more than one ‘world’ at the same time and ‘travelling’ between 
“worlds” is part and parcel of our experience and situation. (Lugones 1987:10-11) 
 
As Lugones notes, “world travelling” is often a necessity for women of color, but she promotes it 
as a practice that women of all backgrounds ought to undertake in a loving manner. The question 
remains how White feminists are to travel to the worlds of women of color without repeating 
unjust imperialistic practices. Though I admit I have no concrete suggestions at this time, I 
maintain that reciprocity is indeed the goal (in both the narrower linguistic sense and the broader 
ethical sense), so that silencing of all types that we have considered here will be avoided. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have attempted to show how silencing, as locutionary disablement, can 
arise in cases of hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, I highlighted a criticism of Fricker’s 
account of hermeneutical injustice—that is, the problematic notion that exclusion from the 
dominant hermeneutical framework harms an individual by obscuring self-understanding. It is 
the case that, as a matter of historical, political, and philosophical practice—as we see in the case 
of the white supremacy as illustrated in The Racial Contract—groups have been deliberately and 
perpetually excluded from the dominant hermeneutical framework. These marginalized groups 
are certainly victims of hermeneutical injustice, because they have been excluded and 
dehumanized in this epistemic manner; but they do not necessarily suffer from a lack of self-
understanding, because they have their own hermeneutical frameworks within which they 
operate. That these frameworks are not generally recognized as legitimate or intelligible by the 
dominant power leads to the marginalized groups’ being locutionarily disabled from 
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participating in communication across groups and as such, these marginalized groups are 
subjected to a third type of epistemic injustice—the epistemic injustice of interpretive burden—
in their struggle to make themselves understood.  
In order to confront, and hopefully eliminate such injustice, deliberate efforts must be 
made on the part of the dominant group to bridge the interpretive gap between hermeneutical 
frameworks—perhaps efforts aimed at something like the notion of world-traveling—or 
“knowing the other’s ‘world’”—as suggested by Lugones: “Without knowing the other’s 
‘world,’ one does not know the other, and without knowing the other one is really alone in the 
other’s presence because the other is only dimly present to one” (1987:18). Knowing the other is 
essential, because what is at stake in epistemic injustice is one’s very humanity in their capacity 
as a knower. 
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